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Reproducibility and sensitivity of 36 methods to
quantify the SARS-CoV-2 genetic signal in raw
wastewater: findings from an interlaboratory
methods evaluation in the U.S.†
Brian M. Pecson, ‡*a Emily Darby,‡*a Charles N. Haas, b Yamrot M. Amha,c
Mitchel Bartolo,d Richard Danielson,e Yeggie Dearborn,e George Di Giovanni,f
Christobel Ferguson,g Stephanie Fevig, g Erica Gaddis,h Donald Gray,i
George Lukasik,j Bonnie Mull,j Liana Olivas,c Adam Olivieri,k
Yan Quc and SARS-CoV-2 Interlaboratory Consortium§
In response to COVID-19, the international water community rapidly developed methods to quantify the
SARS-CoV-2 genetic signal in untreated wastewater. Wastewater surveillance using such methods has the
potential to complement clinical testing in assessing community health. This interlaboratory assessment
evaluated the reproducibility and sensitivity of 36 standard operating procedures (SOPs), divided into eight
method groups based on sample concentration approach and whether solids were removed. Two raw
wastewater samples were collected in August 2020, amended with a matrix spike (betacoronavirus OC43),
and distributed to 32 laboratories across the U.S. Replicate samples analyzed in accordance with the
project's quality assurance plan showed high reproducibility across the 36 SOPs: 80% of the recovery-
corrected results fell within a band of ±1.15 log10 genome copies per L with higher reproducibility observed
within a single SOP (standard deviation of 0.13 log10). The inclusion of a solids removal step and the selection
of a concentration method did not show a clear, systematic impact on the recovery-corrected results. Other
methodological variations (e.g., pasteurization, primer set selection, and use of RT-qPCR or RT-dPCR
platforms) generally resulted in small differences compared to other sources of variability. These findings
suggest that a variety of methods are capable of producing reproducible results, though the same SOP or
laboratory should be selected to track SARS-CoV-2 trends at a given facility. The methods showed a 7 log10
range of recovery efficiency and limit of detection highlighting the importance of recovery correction and
the need to consider method sensitivity when selecting methods for wastewater surveillance.
1 Introduction
The international water community responded rapidly to the
onset of the COVID-19 pandemic by developing methods to
measure SARS-CoV-2 genome concentrations in
wastewater.1–3 This effort was prompted by the identification
of fecal shedding of SARS-CoV-2 in infected individuals.4–6 As
a result, wastewater surveillance has the potential to
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complement clinical testing by providing a broad
observational assessment of the community's health.3,7 Such
knowledge could help guide public health agencies to
identify and respond to outbreaks. Unlike clinical data—
which may be biased toward the evaluation of symptomatic
individuals—wastewater contains regular inputs from the
entire population representing all stages of infection from
symptomatic to pre-symptomatic to asymptomatic
individuals. Furthermore, recent studies have shown that
wastewater surveillance can provide an early warning of
community infection, with wastewater concentrations spiking
several days before identification through clinical testing.7–11
In April, 2020, the Water Research Foundation (WRF) hosted
an international summit to evaluate the use of wastewater
surveillance as an indicator of the distribution of COVID-19 in
communities.12 The participants identified two priority
applications for the use of wastewater surveillance data: 1)
tracking trends in occurrence and 2) assessing the degree of
community prevalence. One of the prerequisites for these
applications, however, is the identification of reliable,
reproducible, and sensitive methods.10,12,13 To help address this
issue, this study performed an interlaboratory evaluation of 36
different methods used to assess the genetic signal of SARS-
CoV-2 in untreated wastewater. The nationwide study included
32 U.S. laboratories from 19 different states each processing
split samples of two different raw wastewaters emanating from
populations known to have high levels of infection. The project
sought to identify if and how the SARS-CoV-2 findings were
impacted by multiple methodological differences such as
sample concentration method, pasteurization pre-treatment,
primer/probe selection, and solids removal steps. The effort did
not intend to standardize a single method, but evaluate whether
the existing methods provide sufficient reliability and
reproducibility to track trends in occurrence and assess the
prevalence of community infection.
2 Methods
2.1 Participating labs
The 32 participating laboratories included 17 academic labs,
6 commercial labs, 4 non-municipal government labs, 3
municipalities, and 2 manufacturers of molecular tests
(Table 1). Prior to the interlaboratory study, many of the labs
were engaged in on-going monitoring efforts across the
country. The participating labs agreed to follow the project's
quality assurance project plan (QAPP) described below and
process ten independent samples over a one-week period.
The project QAPP is described in detail in this section in
addition to an overview of the 36 individual standard
operating procedures (SOPs) evaluated in the study.
2.2 Microorganisms
Human betacoronavirus OC43 was used as a matrix spike to
assess the recovery efficiency of each method. To prepare the
OC43 matrix spike, a concentrated stock of OC43
(betacoronavirus 1 (ATCC® VR-1558™)) was grown in cell
culture using HCT-8 cells (ATCC® CCL-244™), according to
ATCC instructions. The concentration of OC43 genome
copies (GC) in the stock was quantified by reverse
transcription quantitative polymerase chain reaction (RT-
qPCR) against a standard curve of quantitative genomic RNA
from betacoronavirus 1 (ATCC® VR-1558DQ™) to determine
the GC per ml of the stock. Eight labs concurrently evaluated
additional matrix spike organisms, including bovine
coronavirus (BCoV), heat-inactivated SARS-CoV-2,
bacteriophage MS2, bacteriophage Phi6, in vitro transcribed
RNA, and an engineered RNA virus.
2.3 Sample collection, shipping, and handling
As detailed in the QAPP, raw wastewater samples were collected
and distributed from two wastewater treatment plants
(WWTPs) in Los Angeles County on two sampling days: (1) the
Hyperion Water Reclamation Plant (operated by the City of Los
Angeles Sanitation and Environment) on August 17, 2020 (Plant
1) and (2) the Joint Water Pollution Control Plant (operated by
the Los Angeles County Sanitation Districts) on August 19,
2020 (Plant 2). These plants are two of the largest wastewater
treatment plants on the west coast of the United States
(Table 2). The sample collection location at both WWTPs was
Table 1 Participating laboratories
Lab name Lab type State
Biological Consulting Services (BCS)
Laboratories
Commercial FL
Cel Analytical Commercial CA
City of Scottsdale Government AZ
City University of New York Academic NY
Columbia University Academic NY
Hampton Roads Sanitation District Utility VA
IDEXX Laboratories, Inc. Manufacturer ME
Los Angeles County Sanitation Districts Utility CA
Michigan State University Academic MI
Mycometrics Commercial NJ
New York City Department of Environmental
Protection
Government NY
Ohio State University Academic OH
Oregon State University Academic OR
Promega Corporation Manufacturer WI
Saginaw Valley State University Academic MI
SiREM Commercial TN
Source Molecular Corporation Commercial FL
Southern Nevada Water Authority Utility NV
Tulane University Academic LA
United States Environmental Protection Agency Government OH
University of California – Berkeley Academic CA
University of California – Irvine Academic CA
University of Colorado – Boulder Academic CO
University of Maryland Academic MD
University of Missouri Academic MO
University of Nebraska Academic NE
University of Nebraska – Medical Center Academic NE
University of Utah Academic UT
University of Wisconsin Academic WI
Utah State University Academic UT
Weck Labs Commercial CA
Wisconsin State Lab of Hygiene Government WI
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after grit removal prior to primary clarification. At both
WWTPs, a single 40 gallon grab sample was collected at
approximately 10:00 AM. The bulk sample was distributed into
1 gal containers (one for each lab) while mixing the bulk
sample continuously to promote homogeneity. To confirm the
homogeneity of the samples, 1 L aliquots were collected after
the 1st, 17th, and 34th samples and the total suspended solids,
temperature, and pH were measured as surrogates for sample
homogeneity (Table 2). The 1 gallon samples were chilled on
dry ice to a temperature of approximately 4°C and then blind-
spiked with betacoronavirus OC43 to a final concentration of
2.8 × 108 GC/L. The samples were shipped to each laboratory
with enough ice packs to maintain a temperature below 10°C.
The participating labs were instructed to begin processing the
sample between 8:00 AM and 12:00 PM Pacific time on the day
after sample collection (i.e., 24 ± 2 h after sample collection).
2.4 Sample analysis
The participating labs each processed a total of 10 sample
replicates. Most of the labs achieved these 10 sample
replicates by processing five sample replicates from Plant 1
and five from Plant 2. Eight laboratories evaluated the impact
of heat pasteurization (60°C for 60 min) and so they achieved
their 10 sample replicates by processing five sample
replicates without heat pasteurization and five with heat
pasteurization, all from Plant 1.
Each of the participating labs followed their own SOP for
sample pre-treatment, concentration, extraction, and
molecular analysis. Four of the participating labs tested two
different SOPs leading to a total of 36 SOPs evaluated across
the 32 labs. The detailed SOPs can be found in the ESI.† The
SOPs were organized into eight method groups based on the
concentration step prior to RNA extraction and whether
solids were removed prior to concentration. The key method
steps and categorization of the 36 SOPs are shown in Table 3.
Briefly, the starting sample volume ranged from 0.25 mL to
400 mL across the SOPs. The first step in sample processing
was pre-treatment (e.g., heat pasteurization, solids removal,
and/or chemical addition). Most labs did not pasteurize their
samples before processing. SOPs involving heat
pasteurization for all of the samples are marked with “H”
and those involving heat pasteurization for half of the
samples are marked with “(H)”. Approximately half of the
SOPs involved the removal of solids (using either
centrifugation, filtration, or both) prior to concentration.
Method groups with SOPs involving solids removal are
marked with an “S”. Many of the SOPs involved addition of
chemicals to adjust the pH and/or the ionic composition of
the matrix prior to concentration. After pre-treatment, the
next major step in sample processing was concentration. The
four main categories of concentration steps among these
SOPs were 1) no concentration (i.e., direct extraction), 2)
ultrafiltration, 3) filtration using an electronegative
membrane (i.e., HA filter), and 4) PEG precipitation. The next
step in sample processing was extraction. A variety of
different extraction kits and in-house methods were used by
the participating laboratories to extract the RNA from the
sample. After extraction, the molecular analysis was
conducted using either one-step or two-step RT-qPCR or
reverse transcription digital PCR (RT-dPCR). All labs analyzed
the native SARS-CoV-2 molecular signal using the N1 and N2
primer/probes sets and the OC43 matrix spike (Table 4). The
concentration factors (CF) resulting from the different
method steps of the SOPs, calculated using the equation
below, ranged from 5 to 2100.
CF ¼ V sample before processing
V after concentration
×






Vsample before processing = original sample volume before
processing (mL).
Vafter concentration = sample volume after concentration (mL).
Vconcentrate used for RNA extraction = volume of concentrate
used for RNA extraction (mL).
Vafter RNA extraction = volume after RNA extraction (mL).
DF = dilution factor for RNA extract after extraction (i.e.,
[RNA extract volume + diluent volume]/RNA extract volume).
Some of the SOPs using direct extraction (i.e., without a
concentration step prior to RNA extraction) had a comparable
or greater CF than the SOPs with a concentration step. In
these cases, high CFs were achieved by using a large sample
volume for RNA extraction and concentrating the sample
down to a small volume of RNA extract.
While each laboratory followed their own SOP, each lab was
required to adhere to the project's QAPP that described the
quality control requirements.14 The QAPP was constructed to
ensure uniformity in sample collection, shipping and handling,
quality control for the analytical methods, data management,
and validation. Key elements of the QAPP included:
Blind matrix spikes. OC43 was spiked into each
wastewater aliquot to achieve a final concentration of 2.8 ×
108 GC/L. The spike concentration was chosen to exceed
typical background levels by orders of magnitude. Each lab
was required to analyze OC43 concentrations in the same
RNA extract used for SARS-CoV-2 quantification. Results from
the OC43 blind matrix spikes were used to determine the
recovery efficiency for each method.
RT-qPCR standard curves. Standard curves were required
for each qPCR plate in which an environmental sample was
quantified. The QAPP did not specify the use of a single
type of standard due to cost and time constraints; however,
Table 2 WWTP flows and water quality
Parameter Plant 1 Plant 2
Annual average flow (MGD) 275 260
Total suspended solids (mg L−1)a 420 (±60) 520 (±40)
pHa 7.5 (±0.2) 6.9 (±0.1)
Temperature (°C)a 30 (±1) 38 (±1)
a Averages (plus/minus standard deviation) are based on the sample
aliquots collected on the sampling day.
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factorPasteurization Solids removal Chemical addition





























1S.2H 40 All samples Zymo III-P silica
column
Q 200
1S.3(H) 2 Half the
samples
Qiagen QIAamp
Viral RNA mini kit
D 5






















None Ultrafiltrationc Qiagen RNeasy
mini kit
Q 40–200













2S.5 25 No TRIzol Q 63–280
2S.6 30 No Zymo Quick-RNA
Miniprep kit
Q 16–18








3.2 100 No Qiagen QIAamp
Viral RNA kit
Q 880–2100





































































































factorPasteurization Solids removal Chemical addition
























3S.2H 100 All samples Phenol extraction Q 380–1300
3S.3H 50 All samples Phenol extraction Q 160–510





4.2 100 No Qiagen QIAamp
Viral RNA kit
D 53
4.3 100 No Qiagen QIAamp
Viral RNA kit
D 55–83
4.4 282 No Qiagen QIAamp
Viral RNA kit
Q 220
























4S.4 36 No Qiagen QIAamp
Viral RNA kit
Q 590



















a SOP 1.3 centrifuged sample and analyzed solids. b SOP 2.3 separated solids and analyzed both solid and liquid fractions. c SOP 2S.5 used a
concentrating pipette tip in the concentration step (similar principle to ultrafilter). d SOP 3S.1 filters the sample through an electropositive filter to
remove solids and then elutes the viruses adsorbed to the filter with beef extract. The eluant is further concentrated with organic flocculation and
ultrafiltration before extraction. e “Q” indicates reverse transcription quantitative PCR and “D” indicates reverse transcription digital PCR.
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it did specify that any plasmid-based standards be
linearized prior to use.
Positive control. At least one positive control per target
was run on each PCR plate to identify false negative results.
No template control (NTC). The QAPP specified the
inclusion of NTCs using PCR grade water processed by the
same PCR steps as the sample. NTCs were required on every
PCR plate to identify false positive results.
Laboratory method blank. At least one method blank (i.e.,
reagent water handled and processed by the same steps as the
wastewater sample) was required for every round of samples.
Inhibition control. To assess the presence of inhibitory
substances, the QAPP required that a molecular target not
naturally present in the matrix be added to two qPCR wells
in addition to the environmental RNA extract. The same
target was added to two additional wells with PCR grade
water. If the difference in RT-qPCR cycle numbers was greater
than 1.0 between the two samples (i.e., the environmental
extract and the PCR grade water), the labs were required to
dilute and re-run the sample. For dPCR, the signal in the
environmental sample was compared to the signal in the
PCR grade water. If the ratio was less than 0.5, the labs were
required to dilute and re-run the sample.
Molecular duplicates. For each replicate RNA extract, the
molecular analysis was performed in duplicate.
Optional matrix spike. Nine of the laboratories evaluated a
second matrix spike organism in addition to the QAPP-
specified OC43 spike. The labs were required to spike the
second surrogate to the raw wastewater samples at
concentrations exceeding the background concentration. The
sample was processed and analyzed for the surrogate in the
same replicates used to analyze for the native SARS-CoV-2
and the spiked OC43.
2.5 Data analysis
The following quality control exclusion criteria were used to
determine which data were included in the method analysis.
Limit of detection. For RT-qPCR, only results within the
linear region of the standard curve were accepted as
quantifiable results above the detection limit. An allowance
of one CT (corresponding to an approximate two-fold
decrease in concentration) was given when determining
whether the results were within the range covered by the
standard curve. Results that were lower than one CT of the
lowest quantifiable standard were considered non-detects
(NDs). Results that were self-reported by the laboratory as
below the limit of detection or the limit of quantification
were considered NDs. For RT-dPCR, the limit of detection
was defined by each laboratory based on experience (typically
defined as two or fewer positive droplets out of 10 000–20
000); results below the limit of detection were considered
NDs. Two thirds of the SOPs had at least one molecular
replicate that was marked as non-detect due to these criteria.
Non-detects. NDs were not included in the method
analysis. If one of the molecular replicates for a sample
replicate was non-detect and the other was above the
detection limit (duplicates were performed for each sample
replicate), only the result above the detection limit was used.
If both molecular replicates were non-detect, the result for
the sample replicate was non-detect. The number of sample
replicates that were non-detect for both molecular replicates
is presented in the results section.
Standard curves. If multiple replicates were performed for
each standard, only the replicates with quantifiable results
were used to develop the standard curve.
Sample hold time. If the sample was processed more than
24 hours outside of the specified 4 h processing window (8
AM to 12 PM Pacific time on the day after sample collection),
the results were not included in the method analysis. The
results from one SOP (1S.1(H)) were excluded based on this
criterion. Exceptions were made for two labs (SOPs 2.1 and
3.6) who immediately froze the samples upon receipt.
Communication with other researchers at the time suggested
that a freeze/thaw cycle may cause up to a 0.5 log impact on
SARS-CoV-2 enumeration.15 Because the sample contained
the OC43 matrix spike, it was decided that the recovery-
corrected results would minimize the impact of this step and
make it acceptable to include the findings in the analysis.
Contamination. Results from SOPs were included in the
analysis if both the NTCs and method blanks produced
negative results. For a small subset of SOPs (specifically, SOP
1S.2H, 2.3, 2S.3, 4.2, 4S.5H, 4S.7), one of the NTCs or method
blanks produced positive results at or below the LOD and/or
Table 4 Primer and probe sequences for SARS-CoV-2 (N1 and N2 targets) and OC43
Target Primer/probe sequences Ref.
SARS-CoV-2 N1 F: 5′-GAC CCC AAA ATC AGC GAA AT-3′ 2019-nCoV CDC EUA kit, IDT Catalog No. 10006606
R: 5′-TCT GGT TAC TGC CAG TTG AAT CTG-3′
P: 5′-FAM-ACC CCG CAT TAC GTT TGG TGG ACC-BHQ1-3′
Pdouble: FAM-ACC CCG CAT/ZEN/TAC GTT TGG TGG ACC-3IABkFQ
SARS-CoV-2 N2 F: 5′-TTA CAA ACA TTG GCC GCA AA-3′ 2019-nCoV CDC EUA kit, IDT Catalog No. 10006606
R: 5′-GCG CGA CAT TCC GAA GAA-3′
P: 5′-FAM-ACA ATT TGC CCC CAG CGC TTC AG-BHQ1-3′
Pdouble: FAM-ACA ATT TGC/ZEN/CCC CAG CGC TTC AG-3IABkF
OC43 F: 5′-CGATGAGGCTATTCCGACTAGGT-3′ Dare, R.K. et al. J Infect. Diseases, 2007, 196: 1321–8
R: 5′-CCTTCCTGAGCCTTCAATATAGTAACC-3′
P: 5′-6FAM-TCCGCCTGGCACGGTACTCCCT-BHQ-3′
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were negligible compared to the environmental sample. In
these cases, results from the SOPs were included in the
analysis. Consequently, this exclusion criterion only applied
to SOP 3.2 for the N1 target.
Recovery efficiency. If the recovery of the OC43 matrix
spike was less than 0.01%, the SARS-CoV-2 results were
excluded from the method analysis. The results from two
SOPs (2S.1 and 3S.1) were excluded based on this criterion.
Nevertheless, the limit of detection could still be calculated
for these SOPs so their values were included in the method
sensitivity analysis. Several of the SOPs reported OC43
recoveries greater than 100% (e.g., SOP 1S.2H had a recovery
efficiency of 300%). While a recovery efficiency greater than
100% is not theoretically possible, a factor of three difference
between the observed recovery and the theoretical recovery is
within the expected error for the detection of microorganisms
in wastewater via molecular methods. These SOPs were not
excluded from the method analysis.
Cross-reactivity between BCoV and OC43. Several of the
laboratories reported cross-reactivity between OC43 and their
second matrix spike, BCoV. Further investigation showed that
the OC43 primer/probes detected BCoV but not vice versa.
This was confirmed in vitro through quantification of BCoV
cDNA with the OC43 assay as well as in silico using NCBI
BLAST. Because the BCoV was typically spiked at
concentrations that were an order of magnitude lower than
OC43 (SOPs 1S.2H, 2S.3, 3.4, 4S.3, and 4S.7) and because the
current OC43 assay had lower sensitivity towards BCoV
genome than the BCoV assay, the impact was deemed to be
negligible (<10%). In one case (SOP 3.5), the OC43 and BCoV
concentrations were the same order of magnitude. No
correction to the OC43 recovery was deemed necessary
because the BCoV matrix spike led to an approximate two-
fold increase in concentrations, whereas the recovery
efficiencies ranged over several orders of magnitude.
Amplification plots. Five of the SOPs (1.1, 2S.2, 2S.3,
4S.2(H), 4S.7) had non-sigmoidal amplification plots for all of
the sample replicates while the standards had the expected
sigmoidal shape. The results from these SOPs were not
excluded for this reason, but it should be noted that there
may be greater error associated with these results since the
results are more dependent on the fluorescence threshold
selected for qPCR quantification. A non-sigmoidal
amplification curve may be due to a level of matrix
interference that was not detected by the inhibition control
(all five SOPs passed their inhibition controls).
Number of replicates. While most laboratories processed
five sample replicates per sample, four labs processed three
replicates per sample (SOPs 1S.3(H), 2.1, 2.2, and 4S.8(H)), one
lab processed one replicate per sample (SOP 4.4), and SOP
4S.5H processed eight replicates for the Plant 1 and ten sample
replicates for Plant 2. All data were included in the analysis.
A summary of the results that were excluded from the
analysis are presented in Table 5.
After applying the exclusion criteria, the results of the
sample replicates from each WWTP were analyzed separately.
In the eight cases where an SOP was tested with and without
pasteurization, the results were analyzed independently.
When analyzing data by method group, only the five
replicates without pasteurization were included in the
statistical analysis of the method groups so as to not give
extra weight to those SOPs.
2.6 Statistical analysis
The statistical analysis was performed in R using the log10-
transform of the SARS-CoV-2 concentration, recovery
efficiency, and limit of detection.16 One-way ANOVA was used
to compare the results of the eight method groups. A Tukey
post hoc test was used to perform multiple pair-wise
comparisons. Comparisons with a p-value less than 0.05 were
considered significant. Two-way ANOVA, with an interaction
term, was used to evaluate the impact of different method
steps, specifically, heat pasteurization, solids removal,
primer/probe target, PCR platform, and matrix spike
selection. Two-way ANOVA allows for the evaluation of two
independent variables. The difference between the two levels
of the second independent variable are calculated at each
level of the first independent variable and averaged to
determine if the difference is significant. For each of the
method steps evaluated, the first independent variable was
either the SOP or the concentration step and the second
independent variable was the method step of interest: heat
pasteurization, solids removal, primer/probe target, PCR
platform, and matrix spike surrogate. The dependent variable
was either the SARS-CoV-2 concentration or the matrix spike
recovery. When the design was unbalanced, a type III sum of
squares approach was used for two-way ANOVA.
3 Results
Over 2000 data points were produced from the
interlaboratory analyses. This section addresses the
Table 5 Quality control rationale for exclusion of SOPs
SOPs excluded from method analysis Quality control rationale
1S.1 (H) Processed more than 24 h outside specified window
3.2 (excluded N1 results only) Positives in N1 NTC
2S.1 (still included in method sensitivity analysis) Low recovery (<0.01%)
3S.1 (still included in method sensitivity analysis) Low recovery (<0.01%)
Two thirds of SOPs had at least one molecular replicate that were marked as non-detect due to the results falling outside of the range covered by the
standard curve. NDs were not included in the analysis of SARS-CoV-2 results, but the SOPs were still included in method sensitivity analysis.
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reproducibility and sensitivity of the methods, both across all
SOPs as well as within each of the eight major method
groups. In addition, the impact of several other method steps
—namely, pasteurization, primer/probe set, PCR platform,
and matrix spike surrogate selection—was evaluated.
3.1 Reproducibility
The reproducibility of the methods was evaluated at three
different levels: 1) across all method groups, 2) within each
method group, and 3) within each SOP.
Across all methods. To evaluate the variability of the
SARS-CoV-2 concentrations measured by the different SOPs,
the log-transformed N1 and N2 concentrations measured in
the Plant 1 sample replicates (corrected for recovery based on
the OC43 matrix spike) were plotted in a box plot (Fig. 1).
The data showing the uncorrected values can be found in the
ESI† (Fig. S1). The majority of the SOPs had sufficient
sensitivity to obtain quantifiable results for most or all of the
sample replicates performed for Plant 1 and Plant 2. Data
that were below the detection limit or that did not pass the
quality control criteria were not included in this evaluation.
36 SOPs at Plant 1 and 22 SOPs at Plant 2 passed the quality
control criteria and had at least one sample replicate with
detectable concentrations (where methods processed both
with and without pasteurization were considered distinct
SOPs). The variability, or reproducibility, of the different
SOPs was quantified by calculating the range in which 80%
of the data fell. The 10th and 90th percentile concentrations
were 4.4 log and 6.7 log genome copies per liter (GC/L),
respectively, for the combined N1 and N2 datasets (shown as
dashed lines in Fig. 1). In other words, 80% of the values
from 36 different SOPs fell within a ±1.15 log band (2.3 log
range). While a similar degree of reproducibility was
observed at Plant 2, fewer SOPs were tested since those
evaluating the impact of pasteurization only processed the
Plant 1 sample and a greater percentage of the samples that
were processed resulted in NDs (data not shown).
In contrast, the recovery efficiency of the SOPs spanned
seven orders of magnitude (Fig. 2). Correcting for this source of
methodological variability allowed the recovery-corrected
concentrations to converge within a tighter minimum–
maximum range than the uncorrected values (uncorrected data
shown in Fig. S1†), highlighting the importance of correcting
for recovery in obtaining reproducible results across SOPs.
Within a method group. The reproducibility of SOPs
within each of the eight method groups was evaluated
(Fig. 3). The groups were based on the concentration step
Fig. 1 Recovery-corrected SARS-CoV-2 concentrations (N1 and N2 targets) at Plant 1 measured by each SOP. NDs and data excluded based on
the quality control criteria are not plotted. The dashed lines show 10th and 90th percentiles across all N1 and N2 results.
Fig. 2 Log-transformed OC43 recovery efficiency at Plant 1 (Hyperion) and Plant 2 (JWPCP), measured by each SOP. The SARS-CoV-2 results
from the SOPs highlighted are not represented in Fig. 1 due to the fact that the results were all non-detect (gray), the recovery was below the
quality control cut-off of 0.01% (blue), or both (orange).
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prior to RNA extraction—either (1) direct extraction or
concentration by (2) ultrafiltration, (3) HA filtration, or (4)
PEG precipitation—and whether solids were removed prior to
concentration. The reproducibility within each method group
was quantified by calculating the 10th and 90th percentile for
the corrected SARS-CoV-2 concentrations from the replicates
within each method group. Of the method groups with
multiple SOPs, groups 3, 3S, and 4 had the greatest
reproducibility with 10th-to-90th percentile bands of 1 log or
less. Method group 1 had the lowest reproducibility with a
10th-to-90th percentile band of 3.2 logs. The factors leading
to higher reproducibility within some method groups was not
clear from the analysis. Potential factors include features
inherent in the methods that lend themselves towards higher
reproducibility or greater similarity of the SOPs within that
method group. For example, three laboratories in method
group 4 used a very similar SOP and had been in
communication with each other prior to this study. The high
reproducibility observed within group 4 suggests that
aligning the details of an SOP between participants and
greater interlaboratory communication may help to further
improve the reproducibility of methods.
A box plot of the corrected SARS-CoV-2 N1 concentrations
in eight method groups is shown in Fig. 3. Given the
variability of the pooled samples within the method groups,
the recovery-corrected results from the different method
groups were not systematically impacted by solids removal or
concentration. Of the 28 pairwise combinations, only six had
significant differences: 1S and 1 (p = 0.00047), 2 and 1 (p =
0.0028), 3 and 1 (p = 0.031), 4S and 1 (p = 0.0074), 2S and 1S
(p = 0.013), and 3S and 2S (p = 0.0027). In other words,
multiple methods led to similar results if the results were
corrected for recovery. Similar trends were observed at Plant
2 (data not shown). Because only one or two SOPs were
present in method groups 1S and 3S, the variability within
those groups was not as well characterized as the other
groups. Further studies with additional SOPs per group could
be used to confirm the impact of solids removal and
concentration steps.
Within each SOP. The reproducibility of each SOP was
determined by calculating the standard deviation of the log-
transformed results for the five replicates processed by the
laboratory (Table 6). The precision of the SOPs was high
based on a median standard deviation of 0.13 for both the
N1 and N2 targets at Plant 1. The reproducibility with an SOP
generally increased after correcting for recovery.
3.2 Sensitivity
The sensitivity of each SOP was evaluated by quantifying the
theoretical limit of detection (LOD), which was, in turn, a
function of three variables: the recovery efficiency, the
concentration factor (CF), and the instrument detection limit
of the PCR platform. The recovery efficiency for each SOP was
calculated as the percentage of the OC43 matrix spike that
was detected by the method (Fig. 2). The concentration factor
quantified the degree to which the SARS-CoV-2 concentrations
increased as the raw wastewater was processed to produce the
final RNA extract. Concentrations factors were SOP-dependent
(Table 3). The instrument detection limit is the lowest
concentration at which the PCR instrument can reliably
distinguish a target signal from the background. Rigorous
methods for quantifying instrument detection limits have
been described previously,17 but were not evaluated during
this study. In lieu of this, a theoretical instrument detection
limit of one GC per 5 μl PCR assay was assumed.
These three factors were used to calculate the theoretical











The theoretical LOD of the SOPs spanned seven orders of
magnitude (Fig. 4). The high degree of variability in LODs
was due largely to the recovery efficiencies, which also
exhibited a similar range of magnitudes. The band defining
the 10th and 90th percentiles spanned from a theoretical
LOD of 3.0- to 6.1 log GC/L. To understand the sensitivity of
the methods to detect lower concentrations than those
present in the August 2020 wastewater samples, the log-
difference between the measured SARS-CoV-2 concentrations
and the theoretical LOD was determined for each SOP
(shown in Table S1†). The median difference across all
methods was 0.8 logs, though some methods could detect
concentrations 2 log lower or more.
The variabilities in sensitivities can also be evaluated
based on the frequency of sample replicates with NDs at each
WWTP. As anticipated, SOPs with higher LODs (lower
sensitivity) tended to have higher rates of NDs, and SOPs
Fig. 3 Comparison of the log-transformed SARS-CoV-2 (N1)
concentrations at Plant 1 measured by each of the eight method
groups (grouped by concentration step and solids removal). The
number of SOPs and total sample replicates included in each method
group are shown at the top of the box plot.
Table 6 Median and range of standard deviations for sample replicates
processed by the same SOP
Target Uncorrected Recovery-corrected
N1 0.15 [0.04–0.38] 0.13 [0.032–0.60]
N2 0.14 [0.01–0.53] 0.13 [0.033–0.51]
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with lower LODs (higher sensitivity) tended to have fewer
NDs (Fig. 5). Recall, the theoretical LOD is based on the
observed OC43 recovery—the actual SARS-CoV-2 recovery was
not directly measured. Therefore, the fact that a strong
relationship is observed between the LOD and the frequency
of NDs suggests that OC43 is generally providing an accurate
reflection of the relative SARS-CoV-2 recovery across different
methods. It should be noted, however, that other factors
affecting OC43 recovery at each lab (e.g., sample-to-sample
differences, shipping effects, sample handling) may also
contribute to the differences in the calculated LODs.
To assess whether sensitivity was linked to methodological
differences, the LODs for both WWTPs were compared by
method group (Fig. 6). The LODs between method groups
were generally indistinguishable, partially due to the high
variability of LODs within the method groups with solids
removal. In each of these solids removal groups, the large
LOD range was driven by a single SOP in the group with a
high LOD, specifically, 1S.3(H), 2S.1, 3S.1, and 4S.8(H). These
Fig. 4 Log-transformed theoretical limits of detection for each SOP at
Plant 1 (Hyperion) and Plant 2 (JWPCP). The dashed lines show 10th
and 90th percentiles across both Plant 1 and Plant 2. The total number
of non-detects (ND) (combined for SARS-CoV-2 N1 and N2 targets)
out of total number of sample replicates processed by each SOP is
shown in the table below the box plot (a blank cell indicates no NDs).
An “X” indicates the sample was not processed by that SOP.
Fig. 5 Fraction of sample replicates that were non-detect at Plant 1 as
a function of the theoretical LOD. The outlier shown in gray (SOP 3S.1)
processed the sample using a different PCR platform to enumerate
OC43 and SARS-CoV-2.
Fig. 6 Comparison of the log-transformed theoretical limits of
detection (combined for Plant 1 and Plant 2) for each of the eight
method groups (grouped by concentration step and solids removal).
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SOPs all had NDs and/or recovery below 0.01%. Only three of
the 28 pairwise combinations were significantly different and
all were associated with method group 2S: 2S and 1 (p =
0.0011), 2S and 3 (p = 0.0062), and 2S and 4S (p = 0.011). The
SOPs with highest sensitivity were not all associated with the
same method group, meaning that multiple methods may be
capable of achieving high sensitivities.
3.3 Impact of other method steps
In addition to the main method steps differentiating the
SOPs in this study (i.e., concentration step and solids
removal), several other method steps were evaluated, namely
heat pasteurization, primer set, PCR platform, and surrogate
used as the matrix spike.
3.3.1 Pasteurization. To evaluate whether heat
pasteurization impacted the measured SARS-CoV-2
concentrations, five labs used their SOPs to process 10
replicates of the same wastewater: five without heat
pasteurization and five with heat pasteurization conducted at
60 °C for 60 min. Two-way ANOVA showed a statistically
significant (p = 1.5 × 10−13) but small increase (0.41 log for
N1 and 0.31 log for N2) in the corrected SARS-CoV-2
concentrations after pasteurization (Fig. 7). Because there
was no statistically significant difference in the uncorrected
results with and without pasteurization (Fig. S2†), the slight
increase in the corrected pasteurized values was due to the
lower recovery efficiencies in the pasteurized samples
compared to the unpasteurized samples (Fig. S2†).
3.3.2 Primer/probe set. To evaluate whether the selection
of primer/probe set impacted the measured SARS-CoV-2
concentrations, all sample replicates were analyzed using
both the N1 and N2 primer/probe sets. Two-way ANOVA
showed a significant (p-value of 10−8 for Plant 1 and 0.00042
for Plant 2) but small difference between the results: N1 was
0.13 log greater than N2 at Plant 1 and 0.12 log greater at
Plant 2.
3.3.3 PCR platform. To evaluate the impact of the PCR
platform (quantitative PCR or digital PCR), the SOPs were
grouped by platform within each method group (Fig. 8).
There was an unequal distribution of SOPs using quantitative
and digital PCR across the different method groups. Of SOPs
that passed the quality control and had detectable SARS-CoV-
2 concentrations, 22 used quantitative PCR and eight used
digital PCR; the eight SOPs that used digital PCR were
distributed across only four of the method groups. The low
sample numbers and unbalanced datasets made it difficult
to perform a robust statistical comparison of the two
platforms. Based on the preliminary information, no clear
patterns emerged between the two quantification platforms.
Previous studies have indicated that dPCR may have
advantages over qPCR in terms of increased sensitivity and
resistance to inhibitory substances.18,19 Additional studies
would be required to further evaluate the extent to which
such differences exist for the SARS-CoV-2 methods.
3.3.4 Matrix spike selection used for recovery correction.
The impact of matrix spike selection was evaluated by
comparing the recovery of OC43 against a number of
alternatives (Fig. 9). All but one of the surrogates (i.e., in vitro
transcribed RNA used in SOP 1.1) showed a statistically
different recovery than OC43 (p < 0.05), though the
difference between OC43 and the other surrogates varied. For
example, the difference between OC43 and the other
betacoronaviruses—bovine coronavirus (BCoV) and heat-
inactivated SARS-CoV-2—was relatively small compared to the
other surrogates (average of 0.35 log and 0.47 log higher than
OC43, respectively). One systematic difference was that OC43
was added upon sample collection before shipment to the
labs whereas the second matrix spike was added upon receipt
by the individual labs. A lower recovery for OC43 could be
the result of decay that occurred in the sample during
shipment that was not accounted for by the second
surrogate. In comparison to the other betacoronaviruses,
other surrogates had larger differences in recovery than
OC43. For example, enveloped bacteriophage Phi6 had a
recovery that was 3.9 log lower than the OC43 recovery. It is
important to note that differences in surrogate recovery may
Fig. 7 Impact of heat pasteurization on the log-transformed SARS-
CoV-2 (N1 target) concentrations (corrected for recovery efficiency) at
Plant 1. Five sample replicates for each SOP, with and without heat
pasteurization, were performed.
Fig. 8 Impact of the PCR platform (digital or quantitative) on the log-
transformed SARS-CoV-2 (N1 target) concentrations (corrected for
recovery efficiency) at Plant 1. The data are from 22 SOPs (93
replicates) that used quantitative PCR and 8 SOPS (39 replicates) that
used digital PCR.















































































Environ. Sci.: Water Res. Technol. This journal is © The Royal Society of Chemistry 2020
be SOP-dependent, meaning that a surrogate may behave
similarly to another in one SOP but differently in another.
These findings suggest that multiple surrogates may be
acceptable, but highlight the differences between some of the
commonly used selections.
4 Discussion
This study demonstrated that a diverse set of 36 methods
was able to quantify the SARS-CoV-2 genetic signal in raw
wastewater with a high degree of reproducibility. 80% of the
data from the eight different method groups fell within a
band of approximately ±1 log GC/L when corrected for
recovery. This finding bodes well for the nationwide interest
in tracking SARS-CoV-2 in raw wastewater since a single
standardized method may not be critical for obtaining
comparable results between laboratories. Access to multiple,
reliable methods may also increase the number of labs
capable of participating in monitoring efforts and provide
resilience against supply chain issues that have beset these
efforts during the pandemic.
The findings also show, however, that methods-related
hurdles remain before using the data for watershed-based
epidemiology and modeling (e.g., estimating incidence and
prevalence). This end use requires obtaining accurate
information on the absolute concentration of SARS-CoV-2
genetic material in raw wastewater in addition to other
information such as fecal shedding rates as noted below.
Unfortunately, the accuracy of the methods—i.e., their ability to
correctly quantify the true number of SARS-CoV-2 genome
copies—could not be assessed because the actual
concentrations in the raw wastewater samples were unknown.
Despite the relatively tight band of results (80% within ±1 log),
this 2 log range may be too wide for estimating community
infection since 2 logs represents the difference between 1% and
100% of the population being infected. Additional data gaps
must also be addressed for accurately modeling community
infections including information on a) viral shedding rates in
feces during different stages of infection,6,20,21 b) how the
genetic signal changes during travel through the wastewater
collection system,22–24 and c) sewershed modeling to estimate
travel time and dilution. Multiple efforts should be pursued to
address these knowledge gaps.
The findings are encouraging, however, for tracking changes
or trends in virus concentrations. For this purpose, the absolute
numbers quantified are not as important as identifying when
and to what degree those numbers are increasing or
decreasing.25 The collection of SARS-CoV-2 wastewater
concentrations could be used in conjunction with clinical data
to provide complementary information on the extent of
community infection and the effectiveness of public health
interventions. The data could also be used to identify “hot spots”
within a collection system where higher virus concentrations are
measured.7–9 This knowledge could be used to trigger additional
investigations of the populations within that sub-sewershed to
identify and respond to communities experiencing higher
infection rates. One benefit of this type of tracking is that the
changes in wastewater concentrations may precede the clinical
evidence of infection by multiple days, allowing for more
responsive and focused public health interventions. A related
use of this approach is confirmation of ongoing low community
prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 in areas, such as small rural regions,
for which testing rates are low. The use of wastewater
surveillance as a sentinel for community infection has been
described in Utah and at the University of Arizona.11
This study's findings would suggest that the same method
or laboratory be used to assess the SARS-CoV-2 concentrations
over time at a given set of locations. For example, use method
A to assess trends within the sewersheds in region X over time
rather than switching between methods A, B, and C over the
monitoring period. Other regions (e.g., region Y) could select
different methods, but should then use the same method over
the entire testing period to facilitate the tracking of trends. One
exception to this may be cases in which multiple laboratories
use a similar SOP and have demonstrated a high degree of
reproducibility across labs, such as SOPs 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
Fig. 9 Impact of the surrogate used for the matrix spike on the log-transformed recovery efficiency at Plant 1. Five sample replicates for each
SOP were processed and analyzed for both OC43 and the second matrix spike surrogate.
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Given the high degree of intra-method reproducibility observed
(standard deviation <0.2 log GC/L), many methods have
sufficient precision to sensitively detect when changes in virus
concentrations are occurring. Collecting samples at multiple
locations will also help identify where they are occurring.
Factors promoting reproducibility
The high inter-method reproducibility was the result of
three key factors: 1) the results were largely unaffected by
methodological differences, 2) only data passing all QA/QC
checks were included in the analysis, and 3) the QAPP
normalized the findings to account for important sources
of variability.
Minimal impact of methodological differences. The 36
methods were divided into eight groups based on two major
methodological differences: the presence or absence of both
a solids removal step and a sample concentration step. Based
on this study's findings, neither of these methodological
branch points caused a clear, systematic impact on the
enumeration of SARS-CoV-2 levels particularly after correcting
for differences in recovery (see below). Additional work is
recommended to further confirm these findings, though the
preliminary data suggest that these differences are not
important sources of variability.
Another positive finding was that the use of pasteurization
prior to processing led to only modest impacts on virus
enumeration when recovery correction was incorporated. This
variability of approximately 0.3 to 0.4 logs may be acceptable,
particularly if pasteurization pre-treatment is a requirement
for lab safety. Multiple participants in the interlaboratory
comparison noted that their institutions mandated pre-
pasteurization (per CDC guidelines) to minimize the lab
staffs' exposure to the infectious agents in the raw wastewater
(both SARS-CoV-2 and other pathogenic viruses and
microorganisms). One concern was that pasteurization steps
have been previously shown to impact both the infectivity
and genetic signal of other viruses when heated at 72 °C.26
The QAPP prescribed lower temperature, longer duration
conditions for pasteurization (60 °C for 60 minutes) since it
was hypothesized that higher temperature, shorter duration
conditions may have a greater impact on virus fate.27–30
While pasteurization led to a lower recovery efficiency of
OC43, the uncorrected SARS-CoV-2 concentrations were not
statistically different from the unpasteurized samples (Fig.
S2†). This finding suggests that pasteurization does not have
an important impact on the ability of the methods to detect
SARS-CoV-2. Future studies could be used to confirm
acceptable pasteurization conditions and quantify their
impact on recovery and sensitivity.
The two primer sets developed by the CDC for clinical
diagnosis were used in this study. While the N1 primer set
led to significantly higher concentrations than N2, these
differences were considered to be minimal (approximately
0.1 log difference) compared to the other sources of
variability. These findings suggest that future efforts may not
need to evaluate both primer sets for tracking wastewater
concentrations of SARS-CoV-2. Reducing the number of total
PCR reactions per assay may be of particular interest for
resource-constrained settings, though care should be taken
to ensure that primer/probe sets account for mutational
changes in the RNA sequence. The study also included
methods using both qPCR and dPCR. Given the low number
of dPCR methods evaluated, there was not sufficient
statistical power to compare the results from the two
platforms. Based on a preliminary analysis of the data, no
clear pattern of differences emerged between the two
quantification platforms suggesting both may be acceptable
for future monitoring.
Moving forward, additional elements could be specified
in the QAPP that may further improve the reproducibility
across methods. For example, specifying the type of
standards to be used, the RNA extraction methods, and how
the samples are shipped and stored prior to processing may
further control variability. The high reproducibility between
SOPs 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 also suggests that greater consistency
between SOPs and improved coordination between labs can
further improve reproducibility.
Identification and selection of high-quality data. One of
the key conclusions from this study is that any future
monitoring efforts that entail the use of multiple methods
should impose a minimum set of QA/QC requirements via a
QAPP. The scope of the QAPP should cover the entirety of the
process from sample collection, shipping, and handling, to
acceptable analytical methods, to quality control
requirements, data management, and validation. In this
study, the QAPP ensured that all split samples were
homogeneously distributed and processed within a narrow,
specified window. This degree of detail was deemed critical
to assess method reproducibility since some preliminary data
suggested that the virus integrity may decay relatively rapidly
with time and temperature.11 Through the QA/QC
requirements specified—including the use of non-template
controls, extraction controls, matrix spikes, and qPCR
standards—a handful of data were flagged and eliminated
from the analysis (Table 5). By specifying these QA/QC
requirements, data that failed these checks were identified
and justifiably eliminated from the dataset, allowing the
team to focus on methodological sources of variability.
Normalizing across methods. One benefit of a large
interlaboratory method comparison is that it provides an
opportunity to compare methods in a setting where many
variables are held constant. One unexpected finding was the
wide range of recovery efficiencies represented by the
different methods. More than seven orders of magnitude
separated the methods at the extremes indicating a more
than 10 million-fold difference in their ability to recover the
OC43 betacoronavirus from the wastewater matrix. Because
of this huge range, correcting based on the matrix spike
recovery was deemed critical since not correcting for this
factor could lead to equivalent magnitudes of variability. This
recommendation is in line with recent work by Li et al.
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(2019). Other studies have also reported variations between
SARS-CoV-2 methods when processing split wastewater
samples.1,31 It is possible that varying recovery efficiencies
contributed to their reported differences and that recovery
correction would bring the findings into closer alignment.
The quantification of recovery efficiency is a common
requirement in many standard methods such as EPA 1615,
1623, and 1693. While those methods do not require
correcting for recovery, they do specify the range of values in
which those recoveries must fall. Due to a) the fact that a
standard method for SARS-CoV-2 does not exist to define
acceptable recovery ranges, and b) the seven order of
magnitude range of recovery efficiencies reported in this
study, it is recommended that future methods include matrix
spikes to quantify and correct for recovery.
One challenge with correcting for recovery is that it
assumes that the matrix spike behaves similarly to the target
virus. Additional studies are needed to assess how well OC43
mimics SARS-CoV-2 behavior in wastewater matrices,
meaning that correcting based on OC43 (or any other viral
surrogate) may also introduce some degree of variability in
the results. For example, differences between SARS-CoV-2
and the matrix spike organism in terms of solids association,
thermal sensitivity, extraction efficiency and surface
properties may lead to variability when correcting for recovery
after solids removal steps, pasteurization, and concentration
methods, respectively. Nevertheless, the differences between
SARS-CoV-2 and OC43 are likely to have a smaller net impact
on the results than differences in recovery efficiency. The
similarity in recovery efficiencies of the three
betacoronaviruses tested in this study (OC43, BCoV, and
heat-inactivated SARS-CoV-2) provides some assurance that
OC43 may behave in a similar fashion to SARS-CoV-2. In a
post-study poll of the laboratory participants, 87% supported
the practice of reporting and correcting for recovery
efficiency. Additional work to confirm the selection of matrix
spike organisms is recommended.
Evolving the methods
Demonstrating the high degree of reproducibility between
methods is an important step because it confirms that
multiple methods can be used to obtain similar results in
these complex matrices. This does not mean, however, that
all of the methods are equally suited for all future efforts.
One of the most promising end uses for these methods is to
track SARS-CoV-2 concentrations in wastewater as a
bellwether for community health. Ideally, methods employed
for such uses would have both high precision to identify
upward or downward trends in the data as well as high
sensitivity to quantify concentrations in both epidemic (high
community infection) and endemic (low community
infection) settings. To understand how the sensitivity of these
methods translates to potential application of this tool in
endemic settings, the prevalence of COVID-19 in Los Angeles
County at the time of sampling was estimated. Assuming
infected individuals shed SARS-CoV-2 in in their feces for at
least 27 days,6 then 61 000 people with confirmed infections
were shedding SARS-CoV-2 in the wastewater samples
collected during the study.32 In a population of ten million
people, this corresponds to 1 in 160 people. At this level of
community infection, nearly all of the methods were able to
achieve quantifiable results of virus concentrations. The
degree to which the concentration in the wastewater (and
consequently the percent of the population infected) could
decrease while still obtaining quantifiable numbers will vary
across the methods.
The methods showed a sizable range of theoretical limits
of detection with most falling in the 103 to 106 GC/L range
(in comparison, the measured SARS-CoV-2 were generally in
the range of 104 to 106 GC/L). Methods with theoretical LODs
as low as 102 GC/L were also identified that would offer a 10-
to 1000-fold improvement over those methods. Although
methods with varying LODs reported similar corrected values
in this study, it should be emphasized that the use of higher-
sensitivity methods will reduce the probability of obtaining
NDs. Consequently, the selection of more sensitive methods
should be prioritized to track trends over a range of
concentrations. To make this selection, one should target
methods with low LODs (Fig. 4). Additional studies should
identify the methods best suited for tracking trends,
particularly those that offer high precision, reproducibility,
and sensitivity. As the call for more expansive state- and
nationwide monitoring programs increases, methods that
offer higher throughput and lower processing time may also
rise to the top.
The findings can also be used to identify methods that are
best suited for areas with greater resource constraints,
including those without the financial, technical, and material
resources available in large U.S. cities. Through this lens,
methods that have lower material costs, fewer and simpler
steps, and require less specialized knowledge could offer
important advantages. For example, the direct extraction
methods forego the use of downstream concentration steps
eliminating the need for filtration devices, centrifuges, and
additional chemicals. Consequently, these methods may be
cheaper, faster, and easier to run. Further research is needed to
show if these methods can also provide sufficient precision,
reproducibility, and sensitivity, to be the methods of choice for
the diversity of locations across the country and globe.
5 Conclusions
• A nationwide interlaboratory comparison of methods for
the quantification of SARS-CoV-2 genetic signal in wastewater
showed a high degree of reproducibility. 80% of the results
from eight method groups (36 different methods) fell within
a band of approximately ±1 log GC/L when corrected for
recovery. These findings suggest that a variety of methods are
capable of producing reproducible results, though the same
SOP or laboratory should be selected to track SARS-CoV-2
trends at a given facility.
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• Based on the seven order of magnitude range of
recovery efficiencies reported in this study, it is
recommended that future methods include matrix spikes to
quantify and correct for recovery in order to obtain
reproducible numbers between methods.
• Recovery-corrected results did not show a systematic
impact from solids removal or concentration method used.
Additional methods steps that were evaluated (e.g.,
pasteurization, primer set selection, and PCR platform)
generally resulted in small differences compared to other
sources of variability.
• Factors leading to greater interlaboratory reproducibility
include a) the relative insensitivity of the findings to
methodological differences, b) the implementation of strict
QA/QC requirements, c) the use of a quality assurance project
plan to normalize the findings and account for important
sources of variability, and d) implementing a shared SOP
among different laboratories.
• The findings support the use of wastewater surveillance
for tracking trends in the concentrations of SARS-CoV-2
within communities. They also highlight methodological
challenges related to modeling incidence and prevalence.
• Additional metrics should be used to select the best
methods for future efforts including method sensitivity, cost,
equipment requirements, and simplicity.
6 Disclaimer
This manuscript has been reviewed by the U.S. EPA and
approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the
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